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Abstract: According to a widespread view, Thomas Kuhn’s model 
of scientific development would relegate rationality to a second 
plane, openly flirting with irrationalist positions. The intent of this 
article is to clarify this aspect of his thinking and refute this 
common interpretation. I begin by analysing the nature of values 
in Kuhn’s model and how they are connected to rationality. For 
Kuhn, a theory is chosen rationally when: i) the evaluation is based 
on values characteristic of science; ii) a theory is considered better 
the more it manifests these values; and iii) the scientist chooses the 
best-evaluated theory. The second part of this article deals with the 
thesis of the variability of values. According to Kuhn, the examples 
through which epistemic values are presented vary for each person, 
and for this reason individuals interpret these criteria differently. 
Consequently, two scientists, using the same values, can come to a 
rational disagreement over which theory to choose. Finally, I point 
out the limitations of this notion of rationality for the explanation 
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of consensus formation, and the corresponding demand for a 
sociological theory that reconnects individual rationality with 
convergence of opinions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) 
generated a heated debate over the importance of rationality 
to science, since its publication in 1962. For many of his 
critics (and including some of his admirers), Kuhn’s model 
of scientific development would minimize the role of 
rationality, while instead giving prominence to non-
epistemic forces. A more radical line of criticism accused him 
of denying the relevance of reasons in scientists’ making a 
choice in favor of a particular theory. His explanation of the 
resolution of controversies, these critics say, would be 
restricted to social and psychological factors only, thus 
making the reference to rationality dispensable (Shapere 
1964; Scheffler 1982; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1978, 1985; and 
for some of his supporters, see Bloor 1991; Barnes & Bloor 
1982). 
Kuhn rebutted these accusations on many occasions, 
stressing the importance of rationality to his analysis (1970b, 
1970c, 1977d). Nonetheless, there are reasons for the 
existence of so many misinterpretations on this matter: 
Kuhn does not present a detailed and systematic discussion 
of the concept of rationality in his writings. The purpose of 
this article is to fill this gap, developing a theory of rationality 
compatible with Kuhn’s main ideas on topics such as the 
process of choosing theories, values, and scientific pedagogy.  
A better grasp of Kuhn’s notion of rationality will make 
it easier to understand why he rejected accusations of 
irrationalism as being profoundly misguided. Furthermore, 
Kuhn’s notion of rationality is intertwined with his 
perspective on the nature of science and scientific behavior: 
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the considerations used by scientists in choosing theories, 
the sources of divergence in opinion and the possibility of 
rational disagreement. Lastly, this examination will make 
clear the limitations of rationality to produce widespread 
agreement within the community, and the need of social 
mechanisms in order to explain consensus formation. 
As in every philosophy of science, it is in the process of 
theory-choice that the nature and importance of rationality 
arises more urgently.1 For this reason, this article starts with 
a discussion about the role of epistemic values for the 
selection of theories, and how they allow for the definition 
of an implicit notion of rational choice. In the second part, I 
will discuss the structure of scientific pedagogy, and the 
impact it has to the application of values by individuals. 
Lastly, a few observations will be made concerning the 
                                                        
1 I am here making two assumptions. The first, which I consider 
less problematic, is that periods of scientific controversy display 
more clearly the role and nature of rationality. That is why it is 
more illuminating to study rationality in these contexts. Second, I 
am implicitly assuming that the the same kind of rationality is 
operating in all stages of scientific development. It would be 
possible to think that, since Kuhn speaks of two types of 
theoretical change, cumulative and non-cumulative, there would be 
accordingly two different types of rationality, intra- and extra-
paradigmatic (for this position, see De Langhe 2012). However, it 
is important to note that, in any stage of science, scientists are 
judging how well a certain accretion or modification of the 
accepted body of beliefs fits according to values shared by the 
community. Whether this change implies the substitution of a 
paradigm (or taxonomy) or not, it is a different, unrelated matter, 
irrelevant to the assessment of the rationality of the modification. 
This unified theory of rationality seems to me one of the 
consequences of the evolutionary perspective exposed by Kuhn in 
(1991a). 
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problems arising from these conceptions — particularly, the 
explanation of how consensus is formed. 
A GENERAL THEORY OF RATIONALITY 
 
Values 
 
Kuhn’s concept of rationality is directly tied to that of value. 
For him, a rational choice is simply a choice based on the 
values that characterize a certain activity. Therefore, in order 
to understand his notion of rationality, we must first analyze 
his ideas on the nature of values.2 
By definition, values are what someone uses to evaluate 
something: “a certain thing T is evaluated by the subject S 
according to a set of values V”. One way to make this 
relationship clearer is to treat this definition as a 
mathematical function. T is the set of objects under 
consideration (in our case, scientific theories), 𝑇 =
{𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑚}, or the domain of the function; 𝑋 =
{𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑚} is the outcome of the evaluations, or the 
image of 𝑇; and v is the function of evaluation, relating each 
theory 𝑡𝑖 to a particular appreciation 𝑥𝑖. Formally, we have 
that 
𝑣(𝑡𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖  
 
                                                        
2 The references to values in Kuhn’s writings are generally brief 
(e.g. 1962a, 1970a, 1970c; the exception is 1977d). Consequently, 
the absence of discussion on the subject could put some doubt on 
my claim that scientific values are indispensable for a proper 
understanding of his ideas on theory-choice and rationality. But as 
Kuhn himself assures, although his “work has been little 
concerned with the specification of scientific values, [...] it has from 
the start presupposed their existence and role” (1977b, pp. xxl-
xxli). 
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in which 𝑥𝑖 is the evaluation of the theory 𝑡𝑖 according to 
value v. We further arbitrarily define the codomain as 
 
𝑥 ∈ [0,1] 
 
with 0 representing the minimum evaluation, and 1, the 
maximum. 
The next step is trying to define the relation between 
values and rational choices. According to Lacey (2004), three 
aspects define v as being a value of an activity φ for individual 
X. First, v is something that X wants to achieve in φ. Second, 
v is partially constitutive of a good φ, helping to stipulate its 
standard of excellence; in other words, v indicates when 
realizations in φ are good or bad. Finally, everything else 
remaining the same, it is always better that a value be 
manifested to a greater degree (the ceteris paribus clause). 
There is a considerable difference, though, between 
Kuhn’s and Lacey’s views on values. According to the latter, 
the manifestation of v is not the main goal of activity φ and 
does not suffice to define it. A simple example may help to 
illustrate this point. The employee of a car company may 
embrace a set of values, such as honesty and dedication, that 
dictate to a large extent many of his attitudes while he is 
working. His goal, nonetheless, is not that of being honest 
or dedicated, but producing cars. For him, honesty is at most 
a secondary goal. That is why Lacey considers values as being 
only partly constitutive of a good φ: they define good and 
bad achievements for an activity, but do not define a practice 
per se. They allow for distinguishing a good car worker from 
a bad one, but not a car worker from a teacher. 
Kuhn believes that such a conception is based on a 
profound misunderstanding regarding the nature of values. 
Instead, Kuhn defends a view of the role of scientific criteria, 
similar to Hempel’s “quasi-trivial” approach (Hempel 1981, 
1983), that intends to solve both problems at once. 
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According to Kuhn, science is a social practice that is distinct 
from other activities, such as Art and Philosophy, because it 
possesses certain characteristic traits, such as accuracy and 
precision (1983d, pp. 212-13; McMullin 1993, pp. 65-66). If 
these features are what characterize science, then it is 
redundant to say that these features are pursued because they 
lead to the fulfillment of some specific goals: producing 
theories in which they are manifest is simply, by definition, 
to make science (1993a, pp. 251-52). Put differently, values 
are not the means to achieve independent goals in science, but 
the goals of science themselves. Contrary to what we find in 
Lacey, values are for Kuhn totally constitutive of a good φ: 
practicing an activity is synonymous with pursuing the 
achievement of its socially determined values.  
With this, Kuhn avoids two traditional epistemological 
problems at once. First, that of finding the goals of science. 
Those, for Kuhn, are simply the traits that differentiate 
science from other activities in societies. The epistemological 
problem of determining the ends of science thus becomes a 
matter for sociology. A second difficulty, the problem of 
finding the values that would promote the aims of science 
more than any others, is naturally dissolved by this quasi-
trivial approach. There is no sense in looking for values 
capable of promoting objectives of science, because the 
values and objectives of science are one and the same thing. 
 
 
Values and Rationality 
Science is, for Kuhn, an activity guided by multiple values 
(1977d; see note 3 below for more references). This means 
that there is not just a single function of evaluation v but 
instead a set of functions 𝑣𝑖, one for each element of the set 
𝑉 = {𝑣1, 𝑣2, … , 𝑣𝑛}. Therefore, evaluation is more properly 
represented as a system of equations, formally expressed as 
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{
𝑣1(𝑡) = 𝑥1
𝑣2(𝑡) = 𝑥2
…
𝑣𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑛
} 
 
in which 𝑥𝑖 represents the result of applying the value 𝑣𝑖 to 
theory 𝑡. Also, we can define arbitrarily that 
 
𝑣𝑖 ∈ [0,1] 
 
As stated before, values are what define an activity as such, 
and therefore, serve as parameters for evaluating 
achievements in a certain activity (in our case, scientific 
theories). Generalizing this idea to the set V, we can define 
the evaluation of a theory as a function of the various 
constitutive values of science. In a formal way, we have that 
 
(1) 𝑓(𝑣1(𝑡), 𝑣2(𝑡), … , 𝑣𝑛(𝑡)) = 𝑦 
 
in which y represents the outcome of the evaluation of theory 
t from the various values 𝑣𝑖. Arbitrarily, we can stipulate that 
 
𝑦 ∈ [0,1] 
 
We also know from the definition presented by Lacey (2004) 
that it is always better to have more of a value than less. That 
is, 
 
If 𝑣𝑘(𝑡1) > 𝑣𝑘(𝑡2),  
 
then 
𝑓(𝑣1(𝑡1), 𝑣2(𝑡1), … , 𝑣𝑛(𝑡1)) > 𝑓(𝑣1(𝑡2), 𝑣2(𝑡2), … , 𝑣𝑛(𝑡2)), 
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As long as 
𝑣𝑖(𝑡1) ≥ 𝑣𝑖(𝑡2), ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 
Notice that 𝑣(𝑡) and 𝑓(𝑡) are supposed to be continuous 
functions, assuming any value in the specified range. Thus, 
given the restriction of the ceteribus paribus clause, the same 
idea can be rewritten as the following derivative: 
 
(2) 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑣𝑖
> 0, ∀𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 
 
Lastly, a choice can be considered rational when the scientist 
chooses the most well-evaluated theory. Suppose the 
elaboration of increasingly consistent theories is one of the 
defining features of science. Then, a scientist who opts for a 
less consistent theory, all other aspects remaining fixed, 
would be frontally violating the basic patterns of the activity 
she believes to be practicing (1983d, p. 209). This kind of 
“self-defeating action” is, according to Kuhn, the “surest 
index of irrationality” (1993a, p. 252). Formally, we have that 
the choice of a scientist is rational in the case where 
 
(3) If 𝑓(𝑣1(𝑡1), 𝑣2(𝑡1),… , 𝑣𝑛(𝑡1)) > 𝑓(𝑣1(𝑡2), 𝑣2(𝑡2),… , 𝑣𝑛(𝑡2)),  
 
then 
𝑡1 𝑡2, 
 
in which the symbol  represents the choice relation. 
Points (1)-(3) constitute what I call the minimum criterion of 
rationality (the first two describing the evaluation of theories, 
and the third, their choice). Although relatively vague, these 
axioms give a more precise outline to Kuhn’s notion of 
rationality. A choice is rational when it meets the following 
requirements: theories are evaluated through values 
characteristic of scientific activity; the greater the 
manifestation of a value, the better the theory is considered; 
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and among two theories that differ in one or more values, 
the choice must fall on the one that exhibits them to a greater 
degree (as long as this theory is not worse in any aspect). This 
minimum criterion of rationality has also the advantage of 
treating the evaluation of theories as an intrinsically 
comparative process, something strongly defended by Kuhn 
(1962a, p. 146; 1991a; 1992).3  
Nonetheless, these axioms have a very limited scope of 
application: the comparison of theories is restricted to the 
ceteris paribus clause. The minimum criterion of rationality 
gives no  indication about the case in which a theory is better 
than another according to some values and worse according 
to others. But before addressing this issue, I will briefly speak 
about a particular type of value — scientific values, which, 
after all, are those that directly concern Kuhn’s 
investigations. 
 
 
Scientific Values 
 
Kuhn does not present consistent observations regarding the 
precise values that constitute scientific activity. But we can 
obtain some suggestions from his writings — particularly 
from (1977d), where he examines the nature and role of 
values in a more detailed way. In this paper, Kuhn suggests 
five basic criteria that define a good theory: accuracy, 
consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness (1977d, p. 
322).4  
                                                        
3 The most obvious implication of the view that theory-choice is 
an essentially comparative activity is the elimination of any 
concerns about the truth of scientific theories (1991a, pp. 95-96).  
4 Kuhn’s list of criteria changes from paper to paper. He mentions, 
for example: “simplicity, precision, and congruence with the 
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It is important to have in mind that this enumeration is 
more illustrative than exhaustive of scientific values. Kuhn 
has no intention of yielding a definitive description of the 
criteria actually employed by scientists. It is the general 
mechanism of the process of theory-choice, rather than its 
specificities, that concerns him (1977d, p. 321). For that, 
relatively accurate general observations about the typical 
behavior of the scientist are enough to sketch the problem. 
It is the task of sociologists and historians of science, not 
philosophers, to provide more precise descriptions of the 
values involved in the choice of theories. 
Another reason that explains Kuhn’s lack of concern for 
rigorously identifying the constituent values of a good theory 
is that these criteria are learned in practice, rather than 
through theoretical elaborations. Thus, it is unlikely that 
precise formulations can be given for elements whose 
transmission and application is largely tacit. Scientists 
themselves would probably have difficulty in verbally 
expressing the precise structure of their judgments. 
Finally, there is a third aspect that further hampers any 
attempt to provide an exhaustive list of values (at least from 
the perspective of an author with a leaning for the history of 
science, such as Kuhn). It is the fact that these values change 
from time to time and from group to group. Although values 
such as precision and simplicity, when viewed in a very broad 
way, are permanent traits of science, their concrete 
                                                        
theories used in other specialties” (1970a, p. 21); “accuracy, scope, 
simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like” (1970b, p. 261); “accuracy, 
simplicity, fruitfulness, and the like” (1970c, p. 198); “accuracy, 
precision, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, consistency, and so on” 
(1993a, p. 251). Broader presentations of values are given in: 1962a, 
p. 42; 1970a, p. 21; and 1970c, p. 184. See Hoyningen-Huene 
(1993, p. 149), for a complete list of references. 
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understandings vary greatly over time and through scientific 
communities (1977d, p. 335). 
Whatever the difficulties in defining these values are, they 
all share one important characteristic: they are all cognitive or 
epistemic values. Broadly, I mean by this that these criteria 
serve to evaluate a theory regarding its capacity for 
producing knowledge (however this is understood — the 
capacity to solve puzzles, answer problems, broaden our 
understanding of nature, save the phenomena, or some other 
formulation). For Kuhn, cognitive values as precision, 
consistency, comprehensiveness, simplicity, and fecundity 
provide “the shared basis for theory choice” (1977d, p. 322). 
Moral or social considerations, on the contrary, have a small 
or non-existent influence on assessments. The scientist 
described by Kuhn is what Kitcher calls a “pure epistemic 
agent”: one “for whom the primary goal is to reach an 
epistemically valuable state” (1993, p. 308). 
Kuhn has good reasons to believe that non-cognitive 
values are mostly absent from scientists’ evaluations. 
Epistemic values, as seen, define scientific disciplines, 
socially and semantically. It is expected then that scientists 
base their choices almost exclusively on these criteria, since 
appealing to them is part of the language-game of science 
(1977d, pp. 336-37). As Kuhn explains, scientists’ decisions 
“may not be merely personal but must instead be accepted 
as solutions by many” (1962a, p. 167). The demand for 
public justification subordinates the personal interests of the 
scientist to epistemic considerations (Longino 1990, p. 76; 
Van Fraassen 2006, p. 28). 
This conclusion seems surprising, considering the quite 
common reading of SSR as one of the major exponents of 
an externalist tradition in history and philosophy of science. 
Nonetheless, such a reading, I believe, is the most consistent 
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with Kuhn’s ideas.5 Of course, even from an internalist 
perspective, some caveats have to be made. First, values 
should be understood as reasons, and not as motivations or 
causes of scientists’ actions. They do not have to be actually 
present in the mind of the individuals when a choice is made, 
but need only to be presented as justifications when 
demanded, be it during social exchanges or in written 
publications (Glock 1998, entry “causation”).6 Moreover, 
epistemic values should not be understood as universal rules. 
Scientists can disregard such criteria and often do so. That 
does not necessarily invalidate Kuhn’s observations, since 
his aim is simply to present a general model capable of 
accurately describing the motivations that are behind 
scientists’ choices most of the time. 
Also, as I hope to make clear in the second part of this 
article, the idea that scientists choose theories (almost 
always) based exclusively on cognitive values does not imply 
that agents are not subject to external pressures and 
influences. However, non-cognitive factors are not part of 
the evaluation itself. Instead, they act indirectly, determining 
the interpretation of values. Ultimately, we will see, this 
produces a gap between individual rationality and 
communitarian consensus. 
 
                                                        
5 Not only in spirit, but also in its letter, SSR is mostly an internalist 
description of science. At least, according to Kuhn himself (1962a, 
p. xliv; 1997, pp. 287-88). 
6 The fact that scientists need to argue extensively and deeply (and 
often, for a long time) is what makes it unlikely that these values 
will be thought of as mere rationalizations. And even if, for a 
specific individual, these criteria are indeed rationalizations, carries 
no real force in her choice, the social demand for public 
justifications gives these values a real power in convincing other 
people during scientific debates. 
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Expectations 
 
The claim that scientific theories are evaluated solely through 
cognitive values is not a perfect representation of Kuhn’s 
position, though — and not for the reasons mentioned 
above. According to him, epistemic values, despite being the 
main element shaping evaluations, do not constitute “the 
unique or an unequivocal basis for paradigm choice” (1962a: 
168). Scientists’ considerations, he believes, are not restricted 
to what theories can accomplish at the moment of decision. 
Scientists are concerned also with the results they think 
theories might produce in subsequent research (1962, pp. 
156-57, 200).  
The idea that a belief in the future ability of theories to 
produce knowledge is a key element in scientists’ choices was 
the root of many objections and criticisms of SSR (e.g. 
Scheffler 1982; Shapere 1964; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1978). 
The notion of “faith,” that Kuhn made use of in SSR, 
seemed to impose, just as that of “conversion”, a mystical-
religious, irrational character to decision-making. There is no 
doubt that this word choice caused interpretative difficulties 
that resulted in persistent criticisms. However, the idea that 
agents partially base their theory-choices on predictions 
about the future should not sound strange or uncommon. 
After all, decisions involving prospective considerations are 
consistently studied in several branches of the social 
sciences, such as economics and political science. In most of 
these fields, however, such a faith in future events is called 
“expectation.”7 
                                                        
7 Kuhn speaks of “expectations” in SSR, but in a different sense. 
There, it means the type of empirical and theoretical responses 
scientists are conditioned to expect from paradigms (anomalies, for 
example, are nothing more than failures of expectations (1962a, p. 
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Some of the sources for these expectations in the future 
performance of theories are analyzed by Kuhn. One of them, 
for example, is the subjective perception that a theory 
possesses some kind of intrinsic harmony or beauty — the 
theory is “neater,” “more suitable” or “simpler” than its 
competitors (1962a, p. 154). Kuhn also mentions things such 
as religious propensities, personality, and professional 
trajectory (1962a, pp. 151-52) as possible causes of 
confidence in particular theories. 
But not all expectations are fruit of personal and arbitrary 
elements such as these. Two other, more standard, factors 
involved in scientists’ prospective evaluations are discussed 
by Laudan (1978, pp. 106-08).8 They are both inductions that 
predict the future achievements of a theory based on its track 
record. The first of these element is the general progress of a 
theory, its growth in cognitive capacity over time. In a formal 
way, we could represent this as 
 
𝜕𝑓𝑠 (𝜕𝑣𝑠,1(𝑡), 𝜕𝑣𝑠,2(𝑡), … , 𝜕𝑣𝑠,𝑛(𝑡))
𝜕𝑠
 
 
in which s represents a particular instant in time; 𝑣𝑠,𝑖(𝑡) the 
value of theory t according to 𝑣𝑖 in time s; and 𝑓𝑠 the final 
evaluation of theory t in time s. 
The second kind of measure considered by Laudan is the rate 
of progress. This is the acceleration or deceleration of a theory’s 
problem-solving ability, or, in short, the variation of 
                                                        
xliii)). In this article, I use “expectation” as meaning how well a 
scientist thinks a theory will do in the future. 
8 Laudan (1978) is in fact discussing the measures for evaluating 
research traditions. I consider, however, that his ideas, when 
slightly modified, illuminate important aspects of the scientists’ 
expectations. 
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progress. In an analogous way, it can be understood as the 
second derivative of the evaluation function for the variable 
time, or 
 
𝜕2𝑓𝑠 (𝜕
2𝑣𝑠,1(𝑡), 𝜕
2𝑣𝑠,2(𝑡), … , 𝜕
2𝑣𝑠,𝑛(𝑡))
𝜕2𝑠
 
 
Bringing this all together, we can detect three broad causes 
of expectations: the past successes of the theory; its recent 
performance; and the further, subjective motivations 
described by Kuhn. Thus, expectation regarding the 
problem-solving capacity of a theory in the future, 𝑦𝑒, can 
be formalized as 
 
𝑦𝑒 = ℎ(𝑝𝑠(𝑡), 𝑧𝑠(𝑡), … ,𝑚(𝑡)) 
 
in which p is the total progress of theory t until time s; z, the 
rate of progress of theory t until time s; and m, the support 
that further motivations give to theory t.9 Arbitrarily, we can 
define that 
 
𝑦𝑒 ∈ [0,1]. 
 
For Kuhn, these expectations are one of the components of 
evaluation, alongside cognitive value-based appreciation. So, 
an evaluative function that includes all these factors can be 
(compactly) written as 
 
𝐹𝑠 = (𝑣𝑠,1(𝑡),… , 𝑣𝑠,𝑛(𝑡), 𝑦
𝑒) = 𝑤𝑧 
                                                        
9 I did not use a parameter for time in the case of m, because it is 
not obvious that these subjective motivations are dependent on 
time as are the first two parameters. However, nothing would 
change if time was also considered here. 
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in which 𝐹𝑠 is the outcome of evaluation at time s, and 
arbitrarily defined as 
 
𝑤𝑧 ∈ [0,1]. 
 
Undoubtedly, the introduction of expectations as an element 
present in the evaluations of scientists brings considerable 
difficulties. Two problems are particularly pressing. First, can 
we still talk about rational choices when next to the 
traditional epistemic values (accuracy, simplicity, etc.), 
scientists also choose theories based on what they think the 
theory will do in the future? The discussion of different 
causes of expectations aims to balance this problem. 
Certainly, there is no justification for expectations stricto 
sensus: induction remains an unsolved (or unsolvable?) 
problem. But that does not mean that all kinds of 
expectations are equally reasonable. In particular, estimates 
based on the prior performance of a theory seem quite 
different and much more acceptable than expectations 
originating from less palpable aspects, such as aesthetic 
preferences and religious inclinations. Scientists can, for 
instance, debate about the theories’ merits and compare their 
evolution over time. Further, ultimately, all these estimates, 
even subjective ones, have an epistemic concern: they are all 
concerned with the theories’ capacity for producing 
knowledge. So, in this sense, expectations are similar to 
traditional cognitive values. 
A second problem is related to the coexistence of 
expectations with properly epistemic values. It is obvious 
that, with expectation, a theory that is currently not the most 
adequate can be chosen (Laudan 1981, p. 152). This seems 
to make cognitive values dispensable, for in an extreme case, 
high expectations could make any theory preferable. Kuhn 
does not deny that possibility: scientists might indeed choose 
a theory solely for the hope they place on its future success, 
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while assigning little or no weight to its current effectiveness. 
In fact, Kuhn thinks this is not only a theoretical possibility, 
but a situation that once in a while occurs in science. 
Einstein’s rejection of quantum mechanics is a proof, for 
him, that even the greatest scientists may be unmoved by the 
current results demonstrated by theories (1977d, p. 337). 
Nonetheless, despite being a recurring historical 
phenomenon, Kuhn considers that epistemic values tend to 
be preponderant upon scientists’ choices. Generally, he says, 
only a few scientists tend to be enthusiastic about a paradigm 
before “hardheaded arguments can be produced and 
multiplied” (1962a, p. 157; see also 1969c, pp. 342-43). The 
impact of extravagant expectations on the number of 
scientists who accept a theory is in practice quite limited — 
the number of scientists who have high expectations is 
usually small. 
 
 
Aggregation of Values 
 
I mentioned above a considerable limitation of this notion 
of rationality. The comparison of theories is limited to the 
case in which the ceteris paribus clause can be applied. That is, 
a theory is considered better than another when it is at least 
as good in every respect and better in at least one.  
This is not a problem in simple situations. Take as an 
example, a scientist who has to choose among three theories, 
while making use of five epistemic criteria — accuracy, 
scope, simplicity, fruitfulness and consistency. After some 
examination, she ends up with the following ordering of the 
theories according to each value (Table 1):10 
                                                        
10 I had defined the outcome of evaluation as a real number. For 
the case I am treating here, however, the only important thing is 
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 Accuracy Scope Simplicity Fruitfulness Consistency 
Theory 1 1º 1º 1º 1º 1º 
Theory 2 2º 2º 2º 2º 2º 
Theory 3 3º 3º 3º 3º 3º 
 
Theory 𝑡1 seems the obvious choice here, since it is superior 
in all aspects. 𝑡1 is what D’Agostino (2003, p. 13) calls 
“dominant”. 
 
Unfortunately, this is a limiting case. In more complex 
situations, values may, and probably will, differ in their 
respective orderings. Consider, for instance, the following 
evaluation (Table 2): 
 
 Accuracy Scope Simplicity Fruitfulness Consistency 
Theory 1 1º 2º 3º 3º 1º 
Theory 2 2º 1º 1º 1º 2º 
Theory 3 3º 3º 2º 2º 3º 
 
Which theory should a scientist choose now? Given that no 
theory is better over all, the current criterion of rationality 
does not favor any of the alternatives. According to 
D’Agostino (2003, p. 91ff.), two main strategies could be 
adopted in order to cope with this limitation. The first 
strategy is the eliminationist one. As the name suggests, it 
                                                        
their relative positions. For the sake of simplicity, therefore, I 
opted to use ordinal numbers. 
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involves removing some of the multiple dimensions of the 
problem, and reducing the number of available theories or 
values. This brings the situation back to the simplest case, in 
which one of the theories is at least as good as any other 
theory in every aspect. So, for example, if the criteria of 
scope, simplicity and consistency were removed from Table 
2, 𝑡1 would become again dominant over its competitors. 
The problem with the eliminationist strategy, as 
D’Agostino (2003, p. 29) warns, is that it involves a serious 
“moral risk.” Elimination requires discarding a value or 
theory that, in principle, should have been taken into 
account. By implementing this solution, we may end up with 
theories that “are not as good, all relevant matters 
considered, as they might have been if we had considered 
them in their full complexity.”11 
Fortunately, the eliminationist strategy does not account 
for all possible types of resolutions of conflicts among 
values. A second type of approach described by D’Agostino 
involves, instead, the aggregation of values. According to 
him, this aggregation can be done through the establishment 
of a “rate of substitution”: a measure that determines the 
increase in a value a person is willing to accept in exchange 
for a decrease in another (2003, p. 28). 
The rate of substitution can be better understood if we 
consider its relation to the choice function, 𝑓(𝑡). All of the 
                                                        
11 Strictly speaking, the eliminationist strategy does not violate the 
first axiom of the minimum criterion of rationality, which assumes 
in advance a set of theories and values. It is possible to say, though, 
that it undermines a meta-criterion of science, that of trying to 
produce better descriptions and explanations of the world. 
(D’Agostino 2003, p. 94) discusses contexts in which this strategy 
may be valid, such as when the adoption of a new theory involves 
high costs. 
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points at which 𝑓(𝑡) has the same value 𝑦 form, by 
definition, a level curve. The substitution rate is simply the 
set of all the modifications of the values 𝑣𝑖 that produce a 
movement along this level curve. It represents how much 
one is willing to exchange of one value for another, so that 
the overall assessment remains the same. Another way of 
considering the substitution rate is as the solution set to the 
following equation:  
 
(4) 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑣1
𝑑𝑣1 +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑣2
𝑑𝑣2 +⋯+
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑣𝑛
𝑑𝑣𝑛 = 0 
 
in which 𝑑𝑣1 is the amount of variation in the value 𝑣𝑖, or 
 
∆𝑣𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖(𝑡1) − 𝑣𝑖(𝑡2) 
 
To simplify, let us suppose that all the values are fixed, 
except for 𝑣1 and 𝑣2. Then, rearranging (4), we have that 
 
𝑑𝑣1
𝑑𝑣2
= −
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑣2
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑣1
 
 
By the second axiom of rationality, (2), this implies that 
 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑣2
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑣1
< 0 
 
The rate of substitution is therefore a negative number. As 
we would intuitively expect, a decrease in one value is only 
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acceptable when offset by the appropriate increase of 
another one.12 
An alternative way of thinking about this method of 
aggregation is as an assignment of weight. This is, in effect, 
the expression used by Kuhn (1977d, p. 324). The idea is that 
each value has a specific contribution to the overall 
assessment, indicating its relevance to the scientist’s final 
choice (see also D’Agostino 2003, p. ch. 1). Mathematically, 
the weight 𝑚𝑖 is the derivative of 𝑓(𝑡) with respect to 𝑣𝑖. 
This can be expressed as 
 
𝑚𝑖 =
𝜕𝑓(𝜕𝑣1(𝑡), 𝜕𝑣2(𝑡), … , 𝜕𝑣𝑛(𝑡))
𝜕𝑣𝑖(𝑡)
 
 
Because of (2), the weight is always a positive number.  
The substitution rate and the weight are directly 
connected: a substitution rate is simply the ratio of different 
weights. Hence, it is the establishment, either of the values’ 
weights, or of substitution rates between values (which, after 
all, are different ways of expressing the same relations), that 
allows for the aggregation of multiple criteria. 
To simplify, we will make a linearity assumption about 
the weights assigned to the values. This means that we will 
consider the weight of each value as a constant. Treating 
them as a constant seems to be, in fact, the most intuitive 
notion of weight, which refers to a weighted arithmetic 
mean. With this, the first axiom of rationality, (1), becomes 
simply 
 
(5) ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑦
𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
                                                        
12 More precisely, the substitution rate is simply the tangent line to 
a specific point of a particular level curve. 
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in which, by definition, the sum of weights is equal to 1, i.e. 
 
∑𝑚𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 1 
 
It is also necessarily the case that 𝑚𝑖 > 0, ∀𝑚𝑖 since if 𝑚𝑖 =
0, the value in question would not be taken into account (it 
would be a value that it is not a value).13 The third axiom (3) 
becomes therefore, 
 
∑𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡1
𝑛
𝑖=1
) >∑𝑚𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡2
𝑛
𝑖=1
) ↔ 𝑡1 𝑡2 
 
Finally, defining m as the matrix derivative of weights 𝑚𝑖, 
 
𝒎 =
(
 
 
 
 
𝜕𝑓(𝜕𝑣1(𝑡), 𝜕𝑣2(𝑡),… , 𝜕𝑣𝑛(𝑡))
𝜕𝑣1(𝑡)
𝜕𝑓(𝜕𝑣1(𝑡), 𝜕𝑣2(𝑡),… , 𝜕𝑣𝑛(𝑡))
𝜕𝑣2(𝑡)…
𝜕𝑓(𝜕𝑣1(𝑡), 𝜕𝑣2(𝑡),… , 𝜕𝑣𝑛(𝑡))
𝜕𝑣𝑛(𝑡) )
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 We could also consider the possibility of values with negative 
weight: things that scientists despise. However, they are already 
included, in a certain sense, among the values. The contrary of any 
negative value is a positive values. For example, if inconsistency is 
something that scientists want to avoid, it means that consistency 
is a value for them. 
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and ∆𝒗 as the variation in the values 𝑣𝑖, 
 
∆𝒗 = (
𝑣1(𝑡1) − 𝑣1(𝑡2)
𝑣2(𝑡1) − 𝑣2(𝑡2)
…
𝑣𝑛(𝑡1) − 𝑣𝑛(𝑡2)
) 
 
we have that 
 
(𝒎𝑇 . ∆𝒗 > 0) ↔ 𝑡1 𝑡2. 
 
It is possible now to give an answer to the situation in which 
the application of values differs in the ordering of theories. 
The aggregation of values allows a scientist to rationally 
choose a theory even when values point in different 
directions. A choice is rational as long as the scientist selects 
the theory which is superior to all values considered (even if 
it is inferior in the realization of certain particular criteria). 
Provided that the gain in some of the values compensates 
the loss in other criteria, it is rational to choose that theory. 
The remarks presented above show how the aggregation 
procedure can be incorporated so as to make the minimum 
criteria of rationality applicable to a broader set of cases. 
 
 
AN INDIVIDUAL THEORY OF RATIONALITY 
 
The first part of this article sought to systematize Kuhn’s 
main ideas concerning rationality. Scientists are said to be 
acting rationally when they choose the theory which is 
epistemically superior to the available alternatives (available 
at the time of decision and, hopefully, in the future), 
according to the values accepted by the community. Except 
for concerns regarding expectation in the future success of 
the theory, Kuhn’s observations do not differ much from the 
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ideas that preceded the historiographical revolution of the 
1960s. 
What explains then the criticisms directed at his remarks 
on theory-choice (e.g., Shapere 1964; Scheffler 1982; Laudan 
1978), as well as Kuhn’s recurrent defenses of his theses 
against the accusations of irrationalism and relativism 
(1977d; 1970b, p. 259-66; 1970c, sec. 2, 5)? In order to 
understand how Kuhn’s apparently traditional theory of 
rationality could be seen as having such radical 
consequences, we need to examine his remarks on the 
acquisition of values.  
 
 
Scientific Pedagogy 
 
As noted by Mody & Kaiser (2008, p. 378), pedagogy is a 
central analytical category in Kuhn’s work, who often 
emphasizes the “special nature of scientific education” 
(1970c, p. 208; see also 1977d, p. 327). The pedagogy 
explains, for him, numerous aspects of scientists’ behavior 
and scientific practice, including the nature of epistemic 
criteria.14  
According to Kuhn, values are transmitted to students by 
more experienced members of the community, already 
familiarized with the paradigms currently accepted in the 
                                                        
14 According to Laudan (1985, p. 286), “far more than most writers 
on these subjects, he [Kuhn] has tended to stress the importance 
of community and socialization processes in understanding 
scientific enterprise.” Other important aspects of science explained 
by Kuhn through pedagogy are: the acquisition of paradigms, the 
practice of normal science, the selection of research problems, the 
acquisition of language, the impossibility of full communication 
among communities of experts (semantic incommensurability), 
and the standard cumulative view of scientific development. 
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field. Through theoretical and practical examples, these older 
practicians show them how to evaluate theories, indicating 
why some may be considered superior to others. Later, with 
time, the community’s values are adopted by the apprentice 
(1970b, p. 275).  
However, as Kuhn stresses, the examples presented in 
this process are seldom accurate descriptions of actual 
conflicts (1977d, p. 328; see 1962a, ch. 11, for the role of 
textbooks in shaping scientists’ perspective of the history of 
science). Instead, they are stylized and biased expositions 
that simplify real choice situations, presenting them in as 
unproblematic. The qualities of the winning theory tend to 
be highlighted, its weakness underplayed, and the strengths 
of the rejected alternatives diminished or simply ignored. 
Strictly speaking, these situations do not truly recount past 
scientific controversies. Students are simply learning what it 
means for one theory to be better than another. The 
theoretical justifications of theories, found in textbooks, are, 
to a large extent, just pedagogical instruments for teaching 
theories and values. 
This pedagogical simplification has important 
consequences for the application of values. The cases 
presented to students provide immediate choices only 
because they are erected from idealizations made with 
didactical purposes. Things get more complicated, though, 
when scientists need to apply these same values to concrete 
cases in which there is no pre-established response — cases, 
as Kuhn says, in which “there are always at least some good 
reasons for each possible choice” (1977d, p. 328).  
When facing these unprecedented scenarios, scientists 
then have to extend the use of values of textbook 
applications to new problem-situations. It is here that 
learning exerts its force. In spite of the force and strictness 
of scientific pedagogy, the way a scientist understands 
epistemic values is ultimately dependent on her particular 
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experiences. Consciously or not, her previous experience in 
the field, the examples and theories to which she has been 
exposed, education, personality, cultural context, and 
propensity to take risks, are the material on which a scientist 
bases her interpretation to extend the use of values to other 
cases.15 Idiosyncrasies like that are the repository that feeds 
an individual’s view on scientific criteria (1977d, p. 325, 
329).16 For this reason, the application of values to new cases 
inevitably varies from individual to individual (1970b, p. 262; 
1962a, p. 4). 
Kuhn classifies the elements influencing the 
interpretations given by scientists to epistemic values in three 
groups: the previous experience of an individual as a 
scientist, factors outside of science, and personality (1977d, 
p. 325; Hoyningen-Huene 1993, pp. 150-51). But he does not 
examine these classes in any more detail. There are two 
reasons that explain his attitude. The first is the infinitude of 
possible causes, that would prevent any complete analysis. In 
theory, any personal experience can contribute to shape the 
                                                        
15 Kuhn talk of “interpretation” without necessarily connecting the 
term to propositional contents. He means by it the process through 
which an individual grasps or introjects a shared value. 
16 Two observations need to be made. Kuhn does not use 
“interpretation” as necessarily involving a conscious reflection on 
values. For him, interpretation means simply the way an individual 
scientist applies the communitarian values that, in principle, are the 
same for all people. Second, it is important to note that 
idiosyncratic factors determine the evaluation formulas, and not 
choices themselves. The latter depends, not on social factors, but 
on the degree that a theory manifests epistemic values. Sometimes, 
Kuhn himself seems to have made the mistake of thinking that 
social factors directly determine a scientist's choice, when they only 
affect it indirectly, through shaping his evaluative formula (see, for 
example, 1977d, p. 329). 
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interpretation of values. A second reason resembles that 
which led Kuhn to avoid discussions on the precise set of 
scientific values. For his intentions — understanding the 
nature of values and its consequences to theory choice and 
rationality — it is enough to analyze the implications of 
pedagogy to the application of values. 
This does not imply that he considers all the factors 
involved in the interpretation of values as being of equal 
relevance. In SSR, for example, Kuhn emphasizes the time 
and status in the field of research as the most decisive 
element for explaining the position a person adopts in a 
controversy. This is the famous “Planck’s Principle”: older 
and more experienced scientists tend to be more resistant to 
revolutionary changes, while new scientists, eager to create a 
name of their own, naturally lean to new alternatives (1962a, 
p. 150). 
 
 
Beyond Objectivity and Subjectivity 
 
The idea that an individual’s prior experiences contribute to 
determine the evaluation of scientific theories may lead to 
some misunderstandings. The most common is thinking that 
an individual’s evaluation formula is “determined by a mix 
of cognitive and social factors” (Argamakova 2019: 47; see 
also Laudan 1985: 283; Wray 2011: 160-64). 
Kuhn, however, expresses his discomfort in expressing 
things in this manner (1977d, p. 325). In the first place, the 
notion of “subjectivity” applies poorly to these 
idiosyncrasies. Like any other social phenomenon, the 
elements that constitute the formulas of evaluation may, in 
theory, be identified and described (1970c, p. 191). Neither 
individual factors replace epistemic criteria in choices, 
substituting “actual facts” for “bias and personal likes or 
dislikes” (1977d, p. 357). Being science an activity governed 
  Thomas kuhn’s theory of rationality  28 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, v. 42, n. 3, pp. 1-46, Jul-Sep. 2019. 
by a series of characteristic values, scientists must always 
expose their decisions in a manner consistent with this 
disciplinary vocabulary. Moreover, “objective” values are as 
much socially determined as “subjective” elements: they are 
not universally shared, but are part instead of a group’s 
culture and practice. 
Nonetheless, there is a third, and more insidious, 
conception about the subjective nature of the personal and 
professional factors shaping a scientist’s assessment. One 
may think that these elements would distort the impartial use 
of objective criteria, modifying the application of values in 
their pure form. 
Trying to formalize this view, 𝑓𝑢(𝑡) would be an 
objective formula of evaluation. It would be based solely on 
a pure application of epistemic values. The formulas 
nurtured by individual scientists, by its turn, would be a 
mixture of the objective application of values with personal 
factors, such that for every scientist {𝑗} ∈ 𝐽 (where 𝐽 is the 
set of scientists in a community), 
 
𝑓𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑓𝑢(𝑡) + 𝜀 
 
in which 𝜀 would represent the influence of subjective 
factors, or the “error” in relation to the objective evaluation. 
No philosopher or historian would deny that, at least 
sometimes, things like individual prejudices or institutional 
affiliations play a role in scientists’ actual choices. The 
relevant matter is the role assigned to these elements. For a 
certain philosophical tradition, which we might call 
objectivist, there would be “always an objective ordering of 
the available theories” (Worrall 1990, p. 332) — even if 
unknown to scientists. Personal factors, at best, would serve 
to fill the gaps in the knowledge of the objective evaluation 
formula. They would allow scientists to choose between 
theories in the beginning of controversies — periods in 
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which “it was less apparent which theory was superior” 
(Wray 2011, pp. 160-64). In most of the cases, however, 
these particularities would simply distort the objective 
judgment of the scientists. Then, “as evidence increases with 
the passage of time”, we would expect “the algorithms of 
different individuals converge to the algorithm of objective 
choice” (Kuhn 1977d, p. 329). 
Contrary to that, Kuhn sustains that “there is no neutral 
algorithm for theory-choice” (1970c, p. 198), and no formula 
like 𝑓𝑢(𝑡) exists. A number of arguments is provided by him 
to deny the existence of a general, impersonal application of 
epistemic criteria. First, Kuhn considers the repeated failures 
to find this objective formula as pointing to the implausibility 
of the project (1977d, p. 325ff.).  
He then makes a genealogy of the social and 
psychological sources of this conception. For him, the 
responsibility for such a belief in the existence of a universal 
algorithm of choice is due to distortions caused by textbook 
literature (1962a, ch. 11). By assigning a role to crucial 
experiments that they have not had historically, presenting 
solely the arguments of the winning theory, textbook 
historiography gives the impression that there are clear and 
definitive procedures, valid in all times, for justifying and 
evaluating theories. Kuhn also considers that the objectivist 
conception is based on the false assumption that the 
production of consensus necessarily indicates an 
approximation of the formulas of evaluation — ignoring that 
scientists may accept the same theory for different reasons 
(1977d, pp. 328-29; see also D’Agostino 2010). 
Another argument given by Kuhn is based on the nature 
of values, discussed below. Values are transmitted through 
the display of paradigmatic cases. So, when scientists have to 
deal with real choices, they are urged to extend the use of 
these criteria to more complex situations. In this case, the 
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resulting application is based on the only resource they 
posses: their previous experiences. Thus, the very idea of a 
universal evaluation formula, not needing a person 
producing it from the extrapolation of situations she has 
have had contact with, would show itself incoherent. 
A final argument provided by Kuhn is normative in 
character. This is the so-called risk-dispersion argument. 
According to Kuhn, cognitive diversity have epistemological 
advantages over homogeneity. A community whose 
members can rationally disagree in their evaluations allows 
several paths to be pursued simultaneously. This raises the 
chances of someone solving the problems and consequently 
reduces the risk that the research, as a whole, fails. On the 
contrary, in a community whose members possessed an 
objective algorithm of choice, all individuals would choose 
the exact same theory. If just one route is explored, the 
failure of the project becomes more likely. Hence, the 
effectiveness of science in producing of knowledge is better 
explained by Kuhn’s hypothesis that scientists differ in their 
assessments of theories (1970b, pp. 241, 248-49, 262; 1970c, 
pp. 185-86; 1977d, p. 332; see also D’Agostino 2005, 2010; 
Kitcher 1993, ch. 8). 
“Objectivity” and “subjectivity”, in sum, are not the best 
words to describe Kuhn’s ideas on values and rational 
choice. Scientists’ evaluations are indeed dependent on 
factors that vary for each person. But considering their 
choices as subjective can obscure the fact that decisions need 
to be based on epistemic criteria shared by other members 
of the community. At the same time, if we say that the 
resulting evaluation is objective, then objectivity must be 
seen as allowing some degree of individual rational 
disagreement.  
Instead of using the notions of “objective” and 
“subjective”, Kuhn prefers to contrast values with rules. By 
a “rule”, he understand an algorithm of choice, a set of 
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procedures that leads every person to the same conclusions. 
A good example would be a computer algorithm, in which 
the same inputs always give the same outputs. A value, on 
the contrary, may be seen as a kind of “incomplete rule” 
(1977d, p. 331): something that influence choice, but is not 
as specific as to determine a single result. Using an analogy 
with the computer algorithm for the same inputs, the value 
would produce similar outputs, although not quite the same. 
Kuhn is defending that scientific values are not very 
different of the concepts and terms we employ in natural 
language. Most of the words we use are not determined by 
rules, and do not have a fixed meaning (Wittgenstein 2009, 
79§). Our concepts of “chair” or “couch”, for example, are 
not supposed to work in every conceivable situation. Two 
people looking at a uniquely designed furniture would have 
a great chance of disagreeing whether it is a chair or not. 
However, we would hardly say they do not know what a 
chair is, or that their concept of “chair” involves an objective 
concept of chair couples with some subjective elements. We 
naturally assume that the use of concepts is open to a certain 
amount of divergence.  
Epistemic values should be seen, for Kuhn, in the same 
perspective. Most of the time, scientists agree about their 
application. However, in some cases, divergences may arise. 
This happens because values do not determine a unique 
course of action. Instead, they provide general guidelines for 
scientists, highlighting the essential issues involved in the 
decision process and pointing “to the remaining aspects of 
the decision for which each individual must take 
responsibility himself” (1977d, p. 330). Despite being 
critically important to scientific behavior (scientists would 
behave very differently if they had other or no values), the 
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nature of values makes them open to divergences in 
application.17 
 
 
Individual Formulas of Evaluation 
 
The variability in the interpretation of values has direct 
implication for the notion of rationality. Record the general 
parameters that define the choice of a theory as being 
rational: the scientist evaluates available theories according 
to the values accepted by the community; prefers theories 
that manifest these criteria in a higher degree; and chooses 
the theory that is superior overall. When broadly conceived, 
these postulates are valid for every individual. Nonetheless, 
since values may be interpreted differently, their particular 
instantiations will vary from person to person. 
Kuhn indicates two main ways in which individuals’ 
evaluations could differ (1977d; this was already present in 
1970c, sec. 3; see also Laudan 1985). First, scientists may 
disagree on how to apply specific values to concrete cases 
(1977d, p. 322; Laudan 1985, p. 284; D’Agostino 2005, p. 
202). Kuhn mentions a couple of examples of scientific 
                                                        
17 For Daston (2016), Kuhn would be constantly struggling with 
the idea that theory-choice is a “no-rule-governed reasoning”. For 
one side, “the fertility of Kuhn’s paradigms for scientific practice 
lay precisely in their being indefinite enough to point by analogy to 
kindred cases, specific enough to anchor problem-solving 
techniques, and open-ended enough to support research 
programs”. At the same time, Kuhn would share with his critics 
“the conviction that only rules can offer the analytic clarity, 
reliability, and objectivity demanded of all kinds of reasoning 
worthy of the name, including scientific reasoning” (pp. 126-27). 
My solution to this difficulty is to consider values at two levels: 
they are not rule-governed at the community level, but are rule-
governed at the individual level. 
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controversies that involved this sort of disagreement. The 
first was the dispute between the geocentrism and 
heliocentrism. According to Kuhn, prior to Kepler’s 
innovations none of the theories presented a higher overall 
accuracy. His second examples is the debate between the 
oxygen and phlogiston theories. In this case, which Kuhn 
considers more typical, each theory was more accurate in a 
certain aspect, but not enough as to lead to an unequivocal 
choice. “To choose between them on the basis of accuracy,” 
he concludes, “a scientist would need to decide the area in 
which accuracy was more significant” (1977d, p. 323). 
A second form of divergence is related to the weight 
assigned to values (1977d, p. 322). Kuhn illustrates this 
situation once more with the controversy between 
heliocentric and geocentric systems. Consistency with other 
theories, particularly regarding terrestrial phenomena, he 
argues, spoke unequivocally in favor of the geocentric 
tradition. On the other hand, simplicity hung slightly in favor 
of Copernicus — while Ptolemy needed two circumferences 
to explain the general qualitative aspects of the planets, 
Copernicus needed only one (1977d, pp. 323-24; see also 
Laudan 1985, p. 289). In order to choose one of them, a 
scientist had to decide the importance of each of these values 
for a theory. 
This means that more than a set of functions, the 
minimum criteria of rationality should be seen as a set of 
function-sketches. For each scientist j, it gains body as an 
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individual criterion of rationality.18 Our original postulates 
become, then: 
 
∑𝑚𝑗𝑖𝑣𝑗𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑦𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
, 
𝑚𝑗𝑖 > 0,∀𝑚𝑗𝑖 ∈ 𝒎𝒋, 
 
And, 
 
(𝒎𝒋
𝑇 . ∆𝒗𝒋 > 0) ↔ 𝑡1 𝑗𝑡2 
 
in which 𝑣𝑗𝑖 represents the application of value 𝑣𝑖 by 
scientist j; 𝑚𝑗𝑖 is the weight that j assigns to value 𝑣𝑗𝑖 ; 𝒎𝒋 is 
the vector representing the weights of values for j; and 𝑗 is 
the relation of preference for scientist j. Also, ∆𝒗𝒋 is the 
                                                        
18 Salmon (1990) proposes an alternative way to understand 
Kuhn’s remarks on theory-choice, using Bayes’ theorem. He 
assumes a general criterion of rationality (the Bayes algorithm) that 
permits divergences among individuals (the values attributed to the 
a priori probabilities). I think the approach formulated here through 
functions incorporates more easily two factors: the multiplicity of 
values used by scientists and the possible kinds of disagreement. 
The advantage of the Bayesian approach, on the other hand, is to 
display more easily the conditionalization, which is necessary for 
explaining scientists’ evaluation changes (see also Chen & Zhang 
2006). Another alternative approach is Kuukkanen’s (2007) 
coherentist interpretation of Kuhn. This reading is also compatible 
with mine, and, as Salmon’s, helps to illuminate other interesting 
aspects of Kuhn’s thought. Particularly, the coherentist approach 
can give the same treatment to cumulative and non-cumulative 
changes. At least for assessments of rationality, comparative 
evaluation is all that matters. In this sense, normal and 
revolutionary changes can be treated similarly (another matter is 
the implication of revolutions for communication and truth). 
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vector representing the difference in evaluations of 𝑡1 and 
𝑡2, according to j, for all 𝑣𝑖, such that 
 
∆𝒗𝒋 =
(
 
𝑣𝑗1(𝑡1) − 𝑣𝑗1(𝑡2)
𝑣𝑗2(𝑡1) − 𝑣𝑗2(𝑡2)
…
𝑣𝑗𝑛(𝑡1) − 𝑣𝑗𝑛(𝑡2))
 . 
 
Finally, we can define arbitrarily that 
 
𝑣𝑗𝑖 ∈ [0,1], 
𝑦𝑗 ∈ [0,1], 
 
and, 
 
∑𝑚𝑗𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1
. 
 
Having defined how the general criterion of rationality is 
individually specified, let us analyze some situations that 
involve its use in the choice of theories. Let us first imagine 
a situation of disagreement as to the individual application of 
values. Two scientists, {𝑗, 𝑘} ∈ 𝐽, evaluate two theories, 
{𝑡1, 𝑡2} ∈ 𝑇, according to five epistemic criteria: accuracy, 
scope, simplicity, consistency, and fruitfulness. These 
individuals disagree, though, on how effective theories are in 
relation to the manifestation of each value. For the first 
scientist, j, we have the following evaluation (Table 3): 
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 Accuracy Scope Simplicity Consistency  Fruitfulness 
Theory 1 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.5 
Theory 2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.5 
 
k, by its turn, posses the following appreciation (Table 4): 
 
 Accuracy Scope Simplicity Consistency Fruitfulness 
Theory 1  0.5 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.5 
Theory 2 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.5 
 
Suppose, in this case, they both agree on the attribution of 
weights, and that their matrix of weights is, for instance, 
 
𝒎 =
(
 
 
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.2)
 
 
. 
 
Assuming the simple linear model, their overall evaluations 
(the best theory is highlighted in gray) become, respectively 
(Table 5): 
 
 Scientist j Scientist k 
Theory 1 0.64 0.51 
Theory 2 0.48 0.52 
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Therefore, for the first scientist, j, we have that 
 
𝑓𝑗(𝑡1) > 𝑓𝑗(𝑡2), 
 
and thus, by the second postulate of the minimum criterion 
of rationality, 
 
𝑡1 𝑗𝑡2. 
 
For the second scientist, k, we have that 
 
𝑓𝑘(𝑡1) < 𝑓𝑘(𝑡2), 
 
and hence 
 
𝑡2 𝑘𝑡1. 
 
In short, a divergence in the individual application of values 
results in distinct preferences for theories. 
Consider now a second case, in which scientists agree on 
individual values, but disagree on the weights assigned to 
them. The weights attributed by j and k are, respectively, 
 
𝒎𝒋 =
(
 
 
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.1)
 
 
,𝒎𝒌 =
(
 
 
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.2)
 
 
. 
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Also, suppose that their common table of values is the 
following (Table 6): 
 
 Accuracy Scope Simplicity Consistency  Fruitfulness 
Theory 1 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.6 
Theory 2 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 
 
In this case, the overall evaluation becomes (Table 7): 
 
 Scientist j Scientist k 
Theory 1 0.6 0.48 
Theory 2 0.48 0.52 
 
Another type of disagreement in the application of 
values, regarding weighting, leads again to the first scientist 
choosing 𝑡1, and the second, 𝑡2. 
The two cases illustrated above involve just one type of 
disagreement at a time: either in relation to the individual 
application of values or in relation to the relative weights. 
But since epistemic criteria are learned through examples and 
practice, and their interpretation depends on a scientist’s 
particular traits and personal experiences, divergences are 
expected in both aspects — involving the 𝑣𝑖 as well as the 
𝑚𝑖. 
For Kuhn, in sum, scientific disagreement can happen for 
purely epistemic matters (1962a, ch. 12). Rational scientists 
committed to the same values and in possession of the same 
body of evidences may, despite that, choose different 
theories (1977d, p. 324). 
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Other Sources of Variability 
 
The variability in the application of values is, in reality, just 
one of the numerous possible sources of divergence in 
evaluation formulas.19 It was the one chosen by Kuhn to 
discuss the problem in (1977d), possibly because it was not 
based on complex philosophical theses, as 
incommensurability, theory-ladenness of observation, or 
underdetermination of theories. 
I would like to briefly mention some other factors that 
contribute to increase the chance of disagreement in 
judgments (1977d, p. 338). The most important of them is, 
certainly, the incommensurability of scientific theories 
(1962a, pp. 147-49). Scientists may disagree, for example, on 
which problems are more important or the way to solve 
them (Elliot 2017). Also, supporters of different paradigms 
are also “always slightly at cross-purposes” (1962a, p. 112), 
and their communication is “inevitably partial” (1962a, p. 
148). And, in a certain sense, scientists from rival traditions 
live in worlds filled with different entities (1962a, ch. 10). 
Agreement is also harder because tests never have a clear 
validity, being always subject to conflicting interpretations 
(1970a, sec. 3). The same can be said for evidence, which can 
invite alternative interpretations (Barnes & Bloor 1982, sec. 
3; Shapin 1982). Finally, there is the fact that, in practice, 
scientists never fully share their bodies of evidences — 
                                                        
19 And even in this case, we assumed a simple linear function of 
the values that reduces the possibility of disagreements. If scientists 
used other types of functions, the difference between evaluations 
would come not only from the values assigned to the individual 
criteria or the weights given to them, but also from the form of the 
function itself. 
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generally, they tend to be much more informed about things 
related to their own research fields. 
All of these factors open up room for considerable more 
disagreement in evaluations than in the mere application of 
values. I will not explore them here, however, because the 
variability of values is enough for demonstrating the 
possibility of rational disagreement in Kuhn’s approach. The 
only thing to bear in mind is that other elements make it even 
more difficult for scientists to agree on their choices. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is obvious why Kuhn’s concept of rationality led to so 
many criticisms and accusations of irrationalism. In the first 
place, it attributes a central role to non-epistemic factors in 
science. The latter not only determine the problems and 
fields that are explored and the rate with which knowledge is 
produced — they directly contribute to the appreciation and 
acceptance of theories. Further, this theory of rationality is 
incapable of explaining consensus formation by itself. Values 
are not sufficient to delimit a single choice for every 
individual. In consequence, scientists sharing the same values 
and evidences may choose distinct theories, by virtue of 
residual differences in their backgrounds. According to 
Kuhn, the canons of evaluation “are not by themselves 
sufficient to determine the decisions of individual scientists” 
(1977d, p. 325; 1962a, p. 4). “In matters of theory-choice”, 
he says, “the force of logic and observation cannot in 
principle be compelling” (1970b, p. 126). 
Because of this, many critics have concluded that, for 
Kuhn, scientific consensus has to be caused by non-
epistemic forces that favor one theory over its alternatives. 
Since reason does not seem capable of producing a 
compelling agreement, consensus would have to be yielded 
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“by factors that lie outside the ‘normal’ resources of 
scientific inquiry” (Laudan 1985, p. 294).  
Answering this question lies beyond the scope of this 
paper, so I can only suggest the way Kuhn tries to close the 
gap between individual rationality and consensus formation. 
First, he stresses that not everything that is rational is 
necessarily “reasonable.” Some interpretation of values can 
be rational (i.e. follow the requisites of rational action) and, 
despite that, not be considered by the community as serious 
alternatives (1962a, ch. 12). In second place, Kuhn thinks 
that scientific consensus can be produced despite divergent 
formulas of evaluations. This is where dominance enters: 
“Individual scientists,” he claims, “embrace a new paradigm 
for all sorts of reasons and usually for several at once” 
(1962a, p. 151).  
Lastly, Kuhn believes that scientific consensus is not 
engendered by the application of a set of methodological 
tools, but by a series of social-epistemic mechanisms that 
progressively persuades the members of the community.21 
The first, which, I already mentioned, is scientific pedagogy. 
Educational homogeneity restricts scientists’ divergence in 
the application of values, facilitating future formation of 
consensus. Another mechanism is the continuous 
production of evidence and arguments in science. Scientists 
respond to the production of new evidence by constantly 
reevaluating their assessments. This may lead with time to 
the convergence of evaluations, changing the corresponding 
distribution of opinion in the community. The last 
mechanism is the restructuring of the community. When a 
group of scientists remains unconvinced of the validity of a 
theory, two things may happen. If they are few, the majority 
                                                        
21 Kuhn (1962a, p. 151ff.) discusses some of the arguments that 
regularly convert scientists to a new paradigm. 
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may (intentionally or not) marginalize these holdouts. When 
the division among scientists is more profound, the 
community may split, generating new, independent 
disciplines (1962a, ch. 12). A detailed answer to this problem, 
however, is the subject for another article.22 
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